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This paper studies the effects of fiscal policy on private GDP, inflation and the long-
term interest rate in Italy using a structural vector autoregression model. To this end, a 
database of quarterly cash data for selected fiscal variables for the period 1982:1-2004:4 is 
constructed, largely relying on the information contained in the Italian Treasury Quarterly 
Reports. The main results of the study can be summarized as follows. A shock to 
government purchases of goods and services has a sizeable and robust effect on economic 
activity: an exogenous one per cent (in terms of private GDP) shock increases private real 
GDP by 0.6 per cent after 3 quarters. The response goes to zero after two years, reflecting 
with a lag the low persistence of the shock. The effects on employment, private consumption 
and investment are also positive. The response of inflation is positive but small and short-
lived. In contrast, public wages, which in many studies are lumped together with purchases, 
have no significant effect on output, while the effects on employment turn negative after two 
quarters. Shocks to net revenue have negligible effects on all the variables. 
JEL classification: E62, H30. 
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1. Introduction
1 
The lack of consensus in the economic literature on the effects of fiscal policy suggests 
that empirical investigation in this area has still a very important role to play. The issue is 
particularly important for EMU countries, which rely only on fiscal policy to counteract 
adverse macroeconomic idiosyncratic shocks. As theory and empirical evidence indicate that 
the size of multipliers may vary across fiscal instruments (Hemming et al., 2002), it seems 
also important to distinguish between different components of the government budget. 
This paper seeks to contribute to the analysis of the effects of fiscal policy by applying a 
Vector Autoregression approach to Italian data. In particular, the paper studies the effects of 
government spending, distinguishing between wage and non-wage expenditure, and of net 
revenues. To this end we use, as a benchmark, a 7-variable VAR model, which also includes 
private GDP, a measure of inflation, employment and the interest rate. Other specifications are 
also considered for the purposes of establishing a homogeneous comparison with other VAR 
studies, checking for robustness or analysing the effects of fiscal shocks on the main 
components of GDP. 
The VAR approach heavily relies on the existence of reliable and non-interpolated 
quarterly data over a sufficiently long period of time. In Italy quarterly national accounts data 
on general government budget are available only for a few years, hence cannot be used for this 
approach. For our analysis we construct a database of quarterly cash data for selected fiscal 
variables for the period 1982-2004, largely on the basis of the information contained in the 
Italian Treasury Quarterly Reports. 
To identify the fiscal shocks we use a methodology proposed by Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002). In their approach the identification of fiscal shocks is obtained by exploiting decision 
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lags in fiscal policymaking, which allow assuming that discretionary government purchases 
and revenues are predetermined with respect to the macroeconomic variables, and information 
about the elasticity of fiscal variables to economic activity, which enables to identify the 
automatic response of fiscal policy. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) employ a three-variable 
VAR, which includes GDP, government direct expenditure and net revenue. Using U. S. data, 
they find that expansionary fiscal shocks increase output. Following a direct expenditure 
shock, private consumption reacts positively and private investment reacts negatively.
2 The 
response of GDP to a one dollar shock to direct expenditure is around 50 cents at the 4
th 
quarter and gradually increases to a peak of $1.29 at the 15
th quarter. Their results imply a 
cumulative multiplier (i.e. the ratio of the cumulative change in GDP to the cumulative change 
in government expenditure) close to 0.5 at the 4
th and 12
th quarters, reflecting leakages through 
the trade channel.
3
The identification method proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) has also been 
applied to U.S. data in Perotti (2002), who also examines other 4 OECD countries, and in Galí 
et al. (2006). Perotti (2002) uses a five-variable VAR, which includes GDP, the GDP deflator, 
government direct expenditure, net revenue and the interest rate. When using the full sample, 
he finds that the cumulative multiplier of an expenditure shock is positive and lower than 1 at 
the 4
th and 12
th quarters. Galí et al. (2006) use a four-variable VAR, which includes GDP, 
government direct expenditure, employment and the real interest rate. Their results imply a 
larger cumulative multiplier of government spending: its value increases from around unity at 
the 4
th quarter to approximately 2 at the 12
th quarter. The authors find a relatively large They 
find that a government direct expenditure shock in the U.S. induces a positive response of 
private consumption, while the response of investment is not significant. The reported results 
positive reaction of private consumption and no response of investment. A similar approach is 
used by Fatás and Mihov (2001), who rely on Cholesky ordering to identify fiscal shocks. 
                                                           
2  The responses of the components of GDP are assessed on the basis of a 4-variable VAR, which also includes 
the component of GDP whose response they are studying. For the sake of comparability with our findings, we 
report the results obtained by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) using the specification with deterministic trend. 
3  We computed the cumulative multipliers, on the basis of the data reported in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), to 
allow a meaningful comparison with our own results and those of other studies. The cumulative multiplier 
gauges the effects on economic activity per unit of expenditure, thus automatically correcting for the 
persistence of the shock. This feature is particularly important as the fiscal shocks that we identify for Italy 
exhibit a significantly lower persistence than those estimated in the studies using U.S. data.   5
imply values of the cumulative multiplier close to those obtained by Galí et al. (2006). The 
authors also examine separately the effects of wage and non-wage spending, reaching the 
conclusion that a fiscal expansion based on the former is more effective in boosting economic 
activity. However, shocks to wages are far more persistent and this explains, at least for the 
first 3 years, its greater effect on GDP. 
Studies applying the method proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) in countries 
different from the U. S. are relatively scarce, largely owing to the limited availability of 
quarterly public finance data. Perotti (2002) investigates the effects of fiscal policy in 
Australia, Canada, Germany and the UK. He finds that responses to fiscal shocks estimated on 
U. S. data are often not representative of the average OECD country included in the sample. In 
general, the estimated effects of fiscal policy turn out to be small: in the pre-1980 sample 
positive government spending multipliers larger than one are rare; in the post-1980 period 
significantly negative multipliers are the norm; the tax multipliers are even smaller. To assess 
the effects of fiscal policy in France, Biau and Girard (2005) use a five-variable VAR, which 
includes government direct expenditure, net revenue, GDP, the price level and the interest rate. 
Their results imply values of the cumulative multiplier of government spending at the 4
th and 
12
th quarters equal to 1.9 and 1.5, respectively. The authors find a positive reaction of private 
consumption. The effects on private investment are also positive but only in the first year. 
Using data for the Spanish economy, de Castro and Hernández de Cos (2006) find a positive 
relationship between government expenditure and output in the short-term; in the medium and 
long term public spending expansionary shocks are instead associated with higher inflation 
and lower output. 
Summing up, the reviewed studies, which adopt a methodology quite similar to the one 
used in our study on Italy, indicate that in the U.S. a shock to government direct expenditure 
has positive and relatively long-lasting effects on private consumption and output. These 
results are a straightforward implication of all Keynesian models but they have been shown to 
be also compatible with a dynamic general equilibrium model characterized by sticky prices 
and the presence of Ricardian and non-Ricardian consumers (Galí et al., 2006). There is no 
consensus on the effects on investment. The evidence concerning the other countries is mixed 
and very limited.   6
A general point about all these results, including the ones reached in this paper, should 
be made. The cyclical position of the economy is often seen as an important element when 
assessing the impact of fiscal policy on economic activity (e.g. Hemming et al., 2002). In this 
respect, the estimates in these studies should be considered as “average effects”, depending on 
the economic situations which prevailed in each sample period. Therefore, the results may 
generally not offer a good guidance for the effects of fiscal shocks under extreme economic 
circumstances, like a deep recession or a boom. 
Alternative approaches to the identification of fiscal shocks in the context of VAR 
studies have been proposed by Edelberg et al. (1999) and by Mountford and Uhlig (2002). 
Edelberg et al. (1999) study the response of the U. S. economy to specific episodes of military 
build-ups, identified in Ramey and Shapiro (1998). They conclude that there is a significant 
and positive short-run effect on output. Mountford and Uhlig (2002) use sign restrictions on 
the impulse responses in order to identify fiscal shocks. In particular, an expenditure shock is 
identified by a positive response of expenditure for up to four quarters after the shock. In their 
results, a spending shock stimulates output only in the first four quarters, although only 
weakly. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 and Appendix A describe the 
data. In Section 3 we outline the specification of the VAR model and the identification 
method. In Section 4 we present the results concerning the effects of government spending and 
some robustness exercises. In Section 5 we briefly discuss the effects of a shock to net 
revenue. In Section 6 the results of the model including total direct spending (6-variable 
model) are illustrated. Section 7 presents the conclusions. 
2.  Government accounts quarterly 
2.1  Sources and construction of the fiscal data 
The availability of quarterly fiscal variables represents the main constraint for the 
analysis of fiscal policy with VAR models. In Italy, quarterly national accounts data on 
general government budget (based on ESA95) have been released for the first time at the 
beginning of 2004 and are available only from 1999 onwards. Only for government   7
consumption (an aggregate approximately equal to the sum of public wages and purchases of 
goods and services) a national account quarterly series starting in 1980 is available. Thus, the 
use of national account data would have implied two important limitations. It would have not 
been possible to take into account developments in the whole general government budget, 
including revenue, and, also, to distinguish, within government consumption, between wages 
and purchases.
4
The sources of our government budget data are the Italian Ministry of Treasury, which 
publishes quarterly cash figures since the early eighties, and the Bank of Italy. In contrast to 
national accounts data, which are partly elaborated on an accrual basis, Treasury data refer to 
general government actual payments and receipts. It is controversial whether cash-basis or 
accrual-basis data are the most appropriate when studying the impact of government 
operations on the behaviour of the rest of the economy (for a discussion of this issue see, 
among others, Levin, 1993). In fact, our analysis shows that the effects on GDP of government 
consumption, if measured per unit of expenditure, do not change significantly when cash data 
are replaced by national account data (see Section 4.3). 
We consider a 3-way disaggregation of the government budget. On the expenditure side, 
we focus on current spending on goods and services and public wages. The other expenditure 
items, mainly monetary transfers to households and firms, are subtracted from total revenues 
to obtain our third fiscal aggregate, net taxes. Revenues are computed as a residual item 
starting from the cash deficit published by the Bank of Italy on a monthly basis since the early 
eighties. Measuring net revenue as a residual from the cash deficit ensures a better coverage, 
as data on the individual revenue items are not statistically homogeneous over the sample 
period, also owing to the numerous tax reforms enacted during the sample. 
However, as a check, we also constructed net taxes as the sum of individual tax revenues 
minus transfers to households. The results do not qualitatively differ from those presented in 
this paper. 
                                                           
4  In fact, we found that excluding net revenue from the VAR model did not significantly modify our estimates 
(see Section 4.3).   8
In the end, the only budget components which do not appear in our model are interest 
payments and government investment. We exclude the former because they are largely outside 
the scope of government control and the latter because we are not confident enough about the 
quality of the data (the ratio between cash and national account data on investment is very 
volatile over the sample period, ranging from about 80 per cent to almost 100 per cent). We 
plan to explore this issue, including the construction of government investment data, in a 
future work. 
Additional information on the construction of the series and a comparison between our 
cash data and national account data are reported in Appendix A. 
2.2  The seasonally-adjusted fiscal data 
Seasonally-adjusted cash figures in real terms (using the private GDP deflator) for 
current spending on goods and services, public wages and our measure of net revenues are 
plotted in Figure 1. Government spending on goods and services has almost steadily increased 
over the sample period. A significant reduction in the growth rate occurred in the period 
1992-97, when it averaged less than 1 per cent (it was about 6 per cent, on average, in both the 
previous and the following sub-periods), reflecting the consolidation effort in the run-up to the 
monetary union.
5 As a ratio to GDP, current spending on goods and services decreased from 
6.3 per cent in 1991 to 6.1 per cent in 1997. After 1997 fiscal policy loosened, taking 
advantage of the fall in interest payments and by 2003 government spending on goods and 
services was at 7.4 percentage points of GDP. In 2004 this ratio fell slightly, to 7.2, reflecting 
the cash constraints introduced with the budget and reinforced at the end of the year. 
Public wages show a slightly different pattern. After a substantial increase in the 
eighties, it started falling in real terms. A substantial drop occurred over the period 1991-99, 
when it moved from 11.4 per cent of GDP to 8.8 per cent. This decline reflects both wage 
restraints and a fall in the number of employees (by about 5% between 1991 and 1999). Over 
                                                           
5  The corrections introduced by the budget laws for 1992 and 1993 were sizeable: overall, the estimated impact 
on the borrowing requirement (against estimates based on the assumption of constant policies) amounted to 
almost 100 billion euros (about 12 per cent of GDP), of which more than a third coming from expenditure 
cuts. A significant part of these cuts were made on spending on goods and services and public wages. The 
adjustments implemented in the following three years were also considerable.   9
the last years, the number of employees and the related expenditure has again increased 
significantly. As a ratio to GDP, public wages in 2004 reached 10.1 per cent. 
Net revenues have steadily been increasing over the sample period, with the significant 
exceptions of the years 1994, 1998 and 2002. The first two reductions mainly reflected the 
drop in gross revenue, owed to the expiration of temporary tax increases in the previous year 
(e.g., the extraordinary tax in 1997 which aimed at reducing the deficit below 3 per cent of 
GDP, allowing Italy’s participation in the monetary union). The reduction in 1998 (from 48.0 
to 46.5 per cent of GDP, in national accounts) was also due to the introduction of a new tax 
(IRAP), replacing health contributions and other taxes, which, contrary to expectations, did 
not turn out to be revenue-neutral. 
3. The VAR model 
3.1  Specification and estimation 
The benchmark specification of the VAR model includes the following seven variables: 
the real private GDP (i.e., real GDP minus real government consumption), the inflation rate 
based on the private GDP deflator, private employment, the ten-year nominal interest rate, real 
government spending on goods and services, real government wages and real net taxes. All the 
variables, with the only exception of the interest rate, are log-transformed. The sample period 
runs from 1982:1 to 2004:4. All fiscal variables are seasonally adjusted using the TRAMO-
SEATS procedure and expressed in real terms using the private GDP deflator.
6
We use the long-term interest rate, instead of the short-term rate, since the former is 
arguably a more important determinant of components of GDP such as private investment. In 
national accounts, government direct expenditure exactly matches the public component of 
aggregate demand in total GDP. As our data are not from national accounts, we do not observe 
this correspondence: i.e. a shock to cash government spending does not reflect into a 
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upon request.   10
corresponding change in public demand. Therefore, we prefer to include in the VAR private 
GDP (and its deflator) instead of total GDP (and the corresponding deflator). 
The reduced-form VAR is defined by the following dynamic equation: 
   (1)  ( )    t B X 1 t t U X L + = −
where   is the vector of variables,  t X ( ) L B is an autoregressive lag polynomial in the operator L 
and   is the vector of reduced-form innovations. Our benchmark specification includes a 
constant and a linear time trend, which we omit from the notation for convenience. The choice 
of the number of lags is made on the basis of the autocorrelation function of the reduced form 
VAR residuals and the likelihood ratio tests. The number of lags is set to 3 since it provides 
serially uncorrelated residuals.
t U
7 The residuals did not show any sign of ARCH effects and the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic suggested the correctness of the assumption of normality for 
the reduced-form innovations. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test for the presence of unit roots 
indicated that all the variables are integrated of order one. We also tested for the presence of 
cointegrating relationships among the variables and found mixed evidence according to the 
rank and the maximum eigenvalue tests.
8 In this situation and given that our a priori did not 
include a meaningful long-run relationship among the variables, we decided not to impose any 
cointegrating restriction and, thus, estimate the VAR with the variables entering in levels, 
relying on the results of Sims et al. (1990). The stability of the parameters of the model could 
not be tested by recursive estimation of the model because of the limitation imposed by the 
availability of data on the fiscal variables. Similarly, due to data limitation it was not possible 
to estimate the benchmark model for the pre- and post-Maastricht period in order to take fully 
into account the possibility of structural changes in fiscal policy (the results of some 
experiments using dummy variables are reported in Section 4.3). 
In the paper we refer to a number of other specifications. A 6-variable model, where the 
two components of government spending are lumped together, is mainly used for the purpose 
                                                           
7  The likelihood ratio test of 4 lags against the null hypothesis of 3 lags confirms our choice (the likelihood 
ratio statistic is equal to 58.67, which implies a p-value of 0.49 when the degrees of freedom correction for 
short-sample is taken into account, see Sims, 1980). Nevertheless, the results are robust to using 4 lags. 
8  See Lütkepohl, Saikkonen and Trenkler (2001) for a comparison of the two tests. The authors found evidence 
that these two tests may deliver different results when using short samples.   11
of establishing a homogeneous comparison with other VAR studies (Section 4.5). A 5-variable 
model, which includes the four macroeconomic variables of the benchmark model and only 
the fiscal variable we want to analyse, is used to check for robustness in Section 4.2.1. 
Another 6-variable model is used to analyse the effects of fiscal shocks on the main GDP 
components; it includes the variables of the previous 5-variable model, except GDP, 
substituted by the two main components of aggregate private demand (consumption and 
investment). Finally, a few alternative 7-variable models are again used to check for 
robustness. The changes with respect to the benchmark model include the use of alternative 
macroeconomic variables (the short-term interest rate instead of the long-term one), different 
orderings of the budgetary components in the identification scheme, different ways in which 
the variables are expressed (in levels as in the benchmark specification but without trend) and 
the use of the identification approach proposed in Fatás and Mihov (2001). 
3.2  The identification of fiscal shocks 
Our identification strategy builds on Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2002). As 
it is standard in the literature on structural VARs, we assume the following relationship 
between the reduced form residuals   and the structural shocks  :  t U t V
t t BV AU =  
in which the shocks are assumed to be independently and identically distributed with 
covariance matrix equal to the identity one. Only fiscal shocks have a clear economic 
interpretation in our analysis. In the next paragraph we describe the approach we use to 
identify the shocks. 
We start by expressing the reduced-form innovations of the government spending, 
government wages and net taxes equations as linear combinations of the structural fiscal 
shocks  ,   and   to these variables, and of the innovations of the other reduced-form 
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t v v v u u u u u + + + + + + = β β α α α α  
The coefficients   capture both the automatic elasticity of fiscal variable i to the 
“macroeconomic” variables j (y, p, r and e) and the discretionary change in variable i enacted 
by the policymaker in response to an innovation in these macro variables. The coefficients   
measure instead how the structural shock to the fiscal variables affect contemporaneously the 





In this paper we are interested in estimating the structural shocks  ,   and  , and in 
studying the responses of the macroeconomic variables, in particular real GDP, to these 
shocks. However, without further restrictions, the system above clearly does not allow us to 
identify these structural shocks. As in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2002), we 
achieve identification of the model by exploiting the existence of decision lags in fiscal policy 
and institutional information about the automatic elasticity of fiscal variables to real GDP, 
employment and the price level. Specifically, we start with the observation that policymakers 
typically take more than a quarter to enact discretionary measures in responses to shocks to, 
say, real GDP: by the time the policymakers learn about the unexpected change in output, 
decide on the fiscal response, get it approved by the legislative branch, and implement it, 
certainly more than a quarter elapses. As a consequence, with quarterly data the coefficients 
 capture only the automatic elasticity of the fiscal variable i to the macro variable j: due to 
decision and implementation lags, the contemporaneous, discretionary change in variable i in 









Still, without further restrictions one would not be able to identify the coefficients : 
for instance, in the first equation an OLS regression of   on  ,  ,   and   would not 
provide a consistent estimate of  , because all the   are correlated with the structural 
shocks  . In order to identify the system, we need an external estimate of the automatic 





















We compute these elasticities on the basis of institutional information, like statutory tax 
rates, as described in Appendix B. Using these values for the contemporaneous elasticities   
i
j α  13
we can estimate the structural shocks. Using the elasticities described above, we construct the 
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Since not all the coefficients   can be identified, we need to take a stance on the 
ordering among the fiscal shocks, that is to decide which fiscal variable reacts to the others 
contemporaneously. In our benchmark case, we assume that public wages “come first”: this 
assumption is equivalent to setting   and   to zero. We then assume that government 
purchases are decided before net taxes, i.e. that  = 0. Therefore the coefficients ,   and 
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Under these assumptions, the government wages shock is equal to the cyclically adjusted 
residuals of the corresponding equation:  . Since we assume that government 
spending on goods and services can be adjusted taking into account the decision on public 
wages, the coefficient   can be estimated by a simple OLS regression of   on the 
estimate of the government wages shock. Finally the coefficients   and   can be estimated 
by an OLS regression of   on the government spending and government wages structural 
shocks. The coefficients of the equations for real private GDP, the GDP deflator, employment 
and the ten-year interest rate can be estimated recursively by means of instrumental variables 
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using the estimated series for the fiscal shocks  ,   and   as instruments for, respectively, 
,   and  . We then proceed in a recursive way for the price level, employment and the 













Once the reduced form of the VAR and all the coefficients (the alphas and the betas) are 
estimated, we compute the impulse responses using the structural moving average 
representation of the VAR. Error bands are computed by Monte Carlo simulations based on 
1000 replications, as in Stock and Watson (2001). 
 
3.3  Interpreting the fiscal shocks 
The largest fiscal shocks that we estimate tend to match well known episodes of 
government actions (Figure 2). In the case of purchases, the most conspicuous negative shock 
is found in the third quarter of 1992, when fiscal policy reacted to the devaluation occurred in 
the summer. The cumulative sum of shocks over the fiscal consolidation period 1992-97 
amounts to approximately 30% of purchases. Negative shocks are observed throughout the 
period 1996:4-1997:4, with the only exception of 1997:3, when fiscal policy made its last 
effort to obtain Italy’s participation in EMU, as decisions were taken on the basis of the deficit 
for 1997. Afterwards, data generally show the loosening of fiscal policy. More recently, large 
negative shocks reflect the cash restraints imposed at the end of 2002, 2003 and 2004, to 
compensate large slippages with respect to the planned annual deficit. 
Government wage shocks generally reflect the timing of contracts renewals. For 
example, wage increases for the period 2002-03 were paid only in the second half of 2003, 
when about a third of employees received increases and arrears, and in the first half of 2004, 
when contracts for the other two thirds of the employees were signed. As a result, real wage 
shocks are negative in 2002 and in the first half of 2003, and then turn positive. A similar 
pattern can be observed in the period 2000-01. 
In the case of net revenue, the original quarterly series exhibits a large variability, with a 
relatively unstable seasonal pattern. These features, which are reflected on frequently large 
estimated shocks, make the matching between the latter and historical episodes of government 
action less precise. Nevertheless, we estimate uninterrupted positive shocks to net revenue   15
from 1996:4 to 1997:4, indicating that the restrictive fiscal policy aiming at the participation in 
the monetary union concerned almost the entire budget and not only purchases. 
4.  The effects of government spending 
In this section we comment on the responses of the fiscal and the macroeconomic 
variables to exogenous shocks to the two largest components of government direct spending. 
The impulse responses are constructed assuming a shock equal to one per cent of real private 
GDP. For the benchmark specification, in Figures 3 and 4 the whole sets of impulse responses 
to each of the two shocks are plotted. In each graph we present the median response and two 
sets of lower and upper bands, corresponding to the fifth, sixteenth, eighty-fourth and ninety-
fifth percentiles of the distribution of the responses at each horizon. Throughout the paper, like 
in most previous studies, we define as “statistically significant” those estimates for which the 
narrow error band (identified by the sixteenth and the eighty-fourth percentiles) does not 
include zero.
9
All impulse responses can be interpreted as deviations from the baseline and are expressed, 
except for inflation and interest rates for which percentages points are used, as ratios to GDP. 
4.1  The response of fiscal variables 
We start by studying the responses of the fiscal policy variables to shocks to government 
purchases and government wages. A striking feature of the Italian data is that shocks to 
government purchases and, to a lesser extent, those to government wages display little 
persistence. In contrast, a considerable persistence in the response of government spending to 
its own shocks is found in VAR studies based on both U.S. (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002, 
Mountford and Uhlig, 2002, Fatás and Mihov, 2001 and Edelberg et al., 1999) and other 
OECD countries data (Perotti, 2002). 
                                                           
9  As pointed out by Sims and Zha (1999), error bands corresponding to 0.50 or 0.68 probability (the latter 
approximately coincides with our narrow error band) are often more useful than 0.95 bands since they provide 
a more precise estimate of the true coverage probability.   16
In all these studies, government spending is obtained from the national income accounts 
and is measured by total government consumption (essentially the sum of purchases and 
public wages).
10 However, this different aggregation does not explain the difference in the 
estimated persistence of government spending. Indeed, we still find no persistence in the 
shocks when a five-variable VAR that includes the four macroeconomic variables and our 
proxy for government consumption (the sum of cash government purchases and wages) is 
estimated. Interestingly, when we use real government consumption (deflated using its own 
deflator) from the national income accounts in the 5-variable VAR, we find a considerable 
persistence of the government consumption shock, in line with the other VAR studies. The 
persistence is lower but still significant (the shock disappears only after 16 quarters) if we 
apply the deflator of private GDP to the national account series in nominal terms. 
In the case of government wage shocks, their lack of persistence may reflect the 
presence of large transitory sums for arrears. In Italy long delays in public wage settlements 
occurred in the last two decades. As a result, the initial payments after a wage settlement have 
often included large sums for arrears. However, this explanation would imply that our shocks 
estimated at the time of wage settlements could indeed have been largely anticipated. The lack 
of persistence in cash purchases might reflect irregularities in the timing of payments by 
public entities. 
An alternative explanation may be the presence of measurement errors in the fiscal 
variables. To the extent that these errors are white noise and large, then the lack of persistence 
of fiscal shocks is precisely what the impulse responses should display. However, if the lower 
persistence in cash data reflected errors, they would plausibly have lead to distorted or at least 
less precise results, compared to those based on national accounts data. On the contrary, with 
the 5-variable VAR not only we obtain expenditure multipliers that are very similar using 
government consumption or the sum of cash wages and purchases, but in the latter case the 
error bands are significantly narrower for the first quarters (Section 4.3). 
                                                           
10  In some studies, the aggregate also includes capital expenditure. Only Fatás and Mihov (2001) consider wage 
and non-wage public spending separately. In their study, a shock to non-wage spending is also quite 
persistent, though much less than that to wage spending.   17
The responses of public wages to purchases and of purchases to public wages are quite 
small. We find instead persistent positive effects of public wages on net taxes, which are larger 
than those consistent with the automatic working of the tax system.
11 However, the latter are 
always inside the bands (16
th and 84
th percentiles) of our confidence interval, except in the 
fourth quarter. Moreover, most of the effects on revenue depend on the most recent data: they 
halve, becoming fully consistent with the working of the tax system, when we end the sample 
in the mid-nineties. Government purchases, instead, have a large negative effect on net taxes 
in the second quarter, which again disappears soon afterwards. The effect is surprising, as 
GDP expands and this should automatically lead to a positive response of net taxes. The 
negative response may reflect the fact that in Italy mini budgets, decided in the course of the 
year to redress slippages with respect to original targets, have often included cash restraints, 
largely concentrated on purchases, and revenue increases. 
These results are robust to a series of alternative identification schemes and specification 
of the VAR. Inverting the order of the first two fiscal variables (government purchases and 
wages) in our identification scheme or substituting the long-term with the short-term interest 
rate has virtually no effects on all the results. The limited persistency of then shocks also 
present when considering only one fiscal variable (public wages, purchases, or net taxes) at a 
time. 
4.2  The response of output 
After a shock to government purchases private GDP responds with a hump-shaped 
pattern. It increases on impact by around  0.2 percentage points and then it increases further to 
reach a peak of 0.6 percentage points in the 4
th quarter. It slowly returns to trend by the end of 
the second year. The response to a wage shock is initially similar, with an impact of 0.2 
percentage points, but already in the third quarter GDP returns to trend; afterwards the effect is 
constantly positive, hovering at about 0.1 percentage points. However, these responses are 
estimated rather imprecisely and are never statistically significant. 
                                                           
11  The mechanical impact on revenue of an increase in public wages, taking into account social security 
contribution rates and the personal income tax, is currently slightly above 50 per cent. Net revenue would also 
react to the impact on government purchases and private GDP.   18
In our results the different response of GDP to shocks to purchases and shocks to wages 
may be due to a number of factors. At least part of the difference could be due to the effects on 
net revenue of the two shocks. As mentioned in Section 4.1, the shock to purchases is 
accompanied by a transitory but sizeable drop in revenue, which may facilitate the rise in 
economic activity, while the shock to wages  determines an increase in net revenue, which is 
higher than expected. Further, as also mentioned in Section 4.1, wage shocks may be largely 
anticipated, as significant delays in payments typically occur. Finally, the variability that we 
observe in the total amount paid for public wages seems to largely reflect changes in unit 
wages rather than in public employment. In a different institutional context, the relative role of 
these two factors may be different and this may modify the effects on GDP. 
The GDP responses to shocks to purchases appear quite small, if compared to standard 
textbook presentations of the impact of fiscal expansions. However, three points should be 
made on this regard. First, standard analyses focus on total GDP, which includes government 
consumption. Second, the impact depends on the persistence over time of the shock and, as 
already mentioned, the fiscal shocks that we identify are very short-lived. Third, in principle 
we need to take into account that when one component of government consumption is 
shocked, the other moves too, though these effects are quite small. 
One way to address these issues is to compute the cumulative multipliers, i.e. the ratio of 
the cumulative change in total GDP to the cumulative change in total government 
consumption (the sum of the cumulative change in purchases and the cumulative change in 
public wages), in response to each of the two expenditure shocks. This ratio provides an 
approximate measure of the impact on GDP of a unit change in government consumption due 
to a spending shock.
12 As the response of GDP to wages is never significant, we only discuss 
the cumulative multipliers of the shocks to government purchases. The median values that we 
estimate (Figure 5) are quite large relative to the rest of the literature: the multiplier starts at 
about 1.2, it reaches a value slightly below 3 after 6 quarters, and then declines slowly to about 
1.7 after 4 years; it is also estimated quite precisely, so that it is always significant. The fact 
                                                           
12  It can be shown, in a two-variable model, that the cumulative multiplier provides a measure of the effects on 
GDP entirely independent of the persistence of the shock. This feature allows comparing the results of a VAR 
study with simulations of econometric models, where the shocked variable can be kept constant afterwards. 
Unfortunately the result does not hold exactly when more than two variables are involved. We are indebted 
for this analysis to Daniele Terlizzese.   19
that our results are on the high side of the range of available estimates may partly owe to the 
low persistence of the shocks; in models which allow for the presence of Ricardian agents, as 
in Galí et al. (2006), the impact of government spending on consumption and output is usually 
inversely related to the persistence of the shock. 
An issue not addressed by the cumulative multiplier is that the impact on GDP also 
depends on the response of net revenue. If the latter is approximately proportional to the 
response of total GDP, this factor may be disregarded, as it merely represents the automatic 
working of the tax system. In the case of purchases, instead, notwithstanding the GDP 
expansion, there is a large decline in net revenue in the second quarter. A way to partially take 
into account this factor, which may have facilitated the GDP expansion (though, as shown in 
Section 5, changes in revenue alone do not seem to have significant effects on GDP), is to 
modify the cumulative multiplier described above, netting its denominator by the cumulative 
change in net revenue.
13 This modified cumulative multiplier still exceeds 2 at peak, but it is 
lower than the standard indicator. 
An alternative way to assess our results is to compare them with those obtained by 
replicating the estimated fiscal shocks and the responses of the other fiscal variables in a 
model simulation. The results of this comparison, using the Bank of Italy quarterly 
econometric model (BIQEM, see Banca d’Italia, 1986 and Terlizzese, 1993), are presented in 
Figure 6.
14 In the simulation with the Bank of Italy model, the effects on GDP of a shock to 
purchases are smaller but more persistent. In the first two years they are well inside our error 
bands. 
                                                           
13  In standard textbook analyses of the Keynesian model, the effect of fiscal policy on GDP depends to a large 
extent on the deficit, which is very close to the resulting variable at the denominator. Thus, this ratio provides 
a measure of the cumulative impact on GDP of a unit cumulative change in the aggregate deficit due to a 
fiscal policy shock. 
14  In the simulation, nominal interest rates are kept as in the baseline and the responses of fiscal variables to the 
shock to purchases are treated as shocks.   20
 
4.3 Robustness  analyses 
The above results are quite robust across alternative specifications of the model. In 
Figure 7 we present the median response of GDP to a purchase shock in alternative models 
that differ because of the variables included and the way shocks are identified. In particular, 
we present the results of the following five alternative exercises: the first, labelled “short-term 
rate”, includes the short-term interest rate instead of the long-term one; in the second, “levels 
with no trend”, the specification of the VAR, contrary to the benchmark, does not include a 
trend; the third, “5VAR”, excludes the two other fiscal variables; the fourth, “purchases first”, 
uses a different ordering of the expenditure variables when identifying the shocks (in the 
benchmark model wages are ordered first); the fifth, “Cholesky” or recursive ordering, 
identifies the shocks following the approach used by Fatás and Mihov (2001). Under this 
identification scheme, it is assumed that fiscal variables respond in the same quarter to the 
macroeconomic variables in the VAR, while it takes at least one quarter for fiscal policy to 
affect the economy. The ordering of the fiscal variables is the same as in the benchmark 
specification: revenues are allowed to adjust to changes in the two spending components of the 
budget. 
The results obtained with these alternative specifications are generally very close to 
those of the benchmark model and well within the upper (84
th percentile) and lower 
(16
th percentile) bands of the GDP response in that model, also reported in the figure. There 
are only two exceptions. First, in the first quarter there is a sizeable difference between the 
assumption of no impact, underlying the “Cholesky” ordering approach, and all the other 
estimates. This assumption seems however questionable, as usually payments are 
contemporaneous to, or even follow, the actual provision of the goods or services. Secondly, 
excluding the trend among the exogenous variables amplifies the effects on GDP, nonetheless 
leaving broadly the same hump-shaped pattern. 
Figure 8 presents the same robustness exercises, considering a public wage shock. 
Overall, there are no noticeable differences with respect to the results obtained using the 
benchmark specification.   21
We also assess whether our cash data and national account data provide different results. 
This comparison is necessarily restricted to the aggregate of government consumption, for 
which national accounts data are available, and for which the sum of wages and purchases is a 
relatively good approximation (in both cases, we compute variables in real terms by using the 
private GDP deflator). Moreover, it has to be carried out within a 5-variable VAR model, as 
we have not a quarterly series for net revenue in national accounts. 
The national accounts variable is smoother; its shocks exhibit a greater degree of 
persistence, fading away in about four years. The response of GDP is positive in the first two 
years and negative afterwards, as when using cash data, but significantly larger (Figure 9). 
However, there is no significant difference between the cumulative multiplier obtained by 
using the two sets of data (Figure 10). As for the precision of these estimates, in the first five 
quarters the error band is significantly narrower when the cash data are used; afterwards, the 
precision of the estimates based on the two sets of data is the same. 
As a further robustness check we studied the effects of political cycles on the behaviour 
of fiscal policy variables (see Franzese, 2000 and Mink and de Haan, 2005, and the studies 
cited therein) To this end, we added to the benchmark model 5 dummy variables, one for the 
quarters in which general elections were held and the previous four. As a robustness check we 
also considered the elections that were not planned. The dummies in the equations of 
government wages and net revenue are not statistically significant. For government purchases, 
the dummy anticipating by 4 quarters the date of the elections is instead significant, although 
only when expected elections are considered. Lags beyond the fourth one were not significant. 
The OLS estimates indicate that government spending on goods and services are 12 (in the 
case of expected elections) and 5 (in the case of all the elections) per cent higher in that 
quarter. However, the likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis of no political cycle effects 
provides ambiguous results, depending whether “surprise elections” are excluded or not.
15 
With all elections included, the test gives a strong support for the existence of a political cycle 
in purchases (the p-value of the likelihood ratio statistic is 0.007) while in the other case, it 
suggests the opposite conclusion (the p-value is 0.34). In any case, the estimated effects of 
                                                           
15  The test was performed including all dummies up to the fourth in all the equations of the VAR.   22
fiscal policy shocks on the macroeconomic variables did not show any significant change with 
respect to the benchmark model when political cycle effects were taken into account. 
Finally, to assess the possibility of a level shift in the relationships between variables as 
a consequence of the Maastricht Treaty, we run a number of experiments adding dummy 
variables to the benchmark model. In particular, we included in our benchmark specification 
five dummy variables set to 1 from, respectively, 1991:4 (when the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty could have been anticipated), 1992:1 (when the Treaty was signed), 1992:2, 1992:3 and 
1992:4 onward (in order to take into account the possibility of lags in the implementation of 
the Treaty). These dummies were jointly statistically significant but their inclusion did not 
qualitatively modify the impulse responses. In the case of a shock to government purchases, 
the inclusion of the dummies led, in the first two years, to an upward shift of the response of 
interest rates (with a maximum difference of 0.4 percentage points in the 3
rd and 4
th quarters) 
and to a downward shift (by approximately 0.2 percentage points) of the GDP and the 
employment responses. The impulse responses of these variables in the following years, as 
well as those of the other variables, were essentially unaffected. 
4.4  The responses of the other macroeconomic variables and of GDP components 
As Figures 3 and 4 show, the responses of private employment to the two spending 
shocks strongly differ. In the case of a shock to purchases, the effects on private employment 
are close to those of private GDP, though they are slightly more sluggish and persistent, in line 
with what one could expect. Employment increases on impact by almost 0.2 percentage points, 
then it increases further to reach a peak of 0.5 percentage points after 4 quarters, and then 
slowly returns to trend by year 4, two years after the effects on GDP have vanished. In the 
case of a shock to public wages, while the effect on GDP is very small but constantly positive, 
that of employment turns negative in the third quarter and gets progressively larger; after one 
and a half year the effect becomes significant and at the end of the third year tends to stabilize 
at -0.5 percentage points. The negative impact on private sector employment of a positive 
shock to the public sector wage bill is consistent with a number of theoretical models and it 
has some empirical support. For example, in the model presented by Holmund (1997) an 
increase in the average public wage or employment, by increasing the reservation utility of 
private sector workers and their bargaining power, leads to an increase in the average private   23
sector wage and a reduction in private sector employment. Algan et al. (2002) find evidence of 
public employment crowding out private employment. 
The median effects on inflation of the two spending shocks are positive but transitory. A 
shock to purchases increases inflation (measured by the change in the private GDP deflator) 
by 0.3 percentage points on impact. The effects are negligible in all other quarters. The 
cumulated effect on the price level stabilises at slightly less than 0.4 percentage points by the 
end of the first year. In the case of a wage shock, inflation does not react on impact but 
increases by 0.4 percentage points in the second quarter; this increase is, however, almost 
entirely offset in the third quarter; afterwards the effects are negligible and not significant. The 
response of the price level is close to zero at the end of the first year. The limited response of 
inflation to government spending shocks is in line with results obtained by other studies (see 
Perotti, 2002, Henry et al., 2004 and the studies cited therein). In fact, the response that we 
find, though relatively small, is larger than the results of many other studies (e.g., Mountford 
and Uhlig, 2002). 
As for the median response of the long-term nominal interest rate, in the case of a shock 
to purchases it is hump-shaped. Initially, the interest rate falls by 0.3 percentage points; 
afterwards it increases and remains constantly positive. It reaches a peak in the fifth quarter, at 
0.4 percentage points and then slowly declines. The effects are not statistically significant, 
except in the first and the fifth quarters. The initial negative change in the interest rate has 
been already found in other studies (see Perotti, 2002 and studies cited therein); at this stage, 
we do not have a convincing explanation for this negative impact effect. A shock to public 
wages leads to a similar hump-shaped response on the interest rate, but there is a positive 
effect already in the first quarter. The peak is, at the fourth quarter, also at 0.4 percentage 
points and significant. The other effects are not statistically significant. 
When studying the GDP response to a given spending shock, the results are virtually 
identical when the other spending variable and net taxes are excluded (Figures 7 and 8). Thus, 
we study the effects of spending shocks on private consumption and private investment by 
having both these two variables in a 6-variable VAR that only includes the government 
spending variable whose shock we are studying.   24
The responses of private investment and private consumption to a shock to purchases are 
both positive; for investment the effects are significant between the 2
nd and the 6
th quarter, 
while for consumption this holds only for the 2
nd quarter. Figure 11 displays these responses 
expressed as shares of GDP, by multiplying them by the average share of private investment 
and private consumption in GDP, respectively. The two components exhibit roughly similar 
patterns: both responses are hump-shaped, starting at about zero on impact and reaching a 
peak in the fourth quarter, at about 0.2 percentage points of GDP in the case of investment, 0.3 
percentage points in the case of consumption. When the two components are added together, 
they explain relatively well the effects of purchases on GDP in the benchmark 7-variable 
model. The responses of private investment and consumptions to a shock to public wages are 
both positive but never significant. 
5.  The effects of shocks to net revenue 
In Figure 12 the whole set of impulse responses to a shock to net revenues equal to 
1 percentage point of GDP for the benchmark specification is plotted. Like in the case of the 
other fiscal shocks, the response of net revenue to its own shock is short-lived: after the first 
quarter it hovers around 0.1 per cent of GDP. Overall, we find that the effects of net revenue 
shocks on the other variables are very small and somewhat contradictory. In particular, rather 
counter-intuitively, we estimate a positive and statistically significant effect on GDP; however, 
this effect is transitory and extremely small, reaching a peak at 0.16 per cent of GDP in the 5
th 
quarter. In contrast, we find a permanent negative effect on employment, significant in some 
quarters but always very small (0.1 per cent of GDP). We obtain similar results in the 
alternative specifications that have been considered for assessing the robustness of the effects 
of government purchases and wages. 
6.  Results of the model including total direct spending (6-variable model) 
To establish a comparable setup with those used in most of the VAR studies on the 
topic, we consider a specification in which the two main components of government 
expenditure, namely wages and purchases of goods and services, are lumped together. In this   25
way we focus on the impact of current direct expenditures, which in Italy account for almost 
ninety per cent of total direct expenditure. 
The other variables are the same as in the benchmark model. Figure 13 displays the 
impulse responses to a one-percentage point of GDP shock to government expenditure of the 
six variables included in the VAR. The median and the two sets of lower and upper bands 
(corresponding to the fifth, sixteenth, eighty-four and ninety-fifth percentiles of the 
distribution) are presented. Figure 14 reports the impulse responses to a shock to net revenue 
(the analogous overview of the results obtained for the benchmark model is provided in 
Figures 3, 4 and 12). 
As in the benchmark model, the shock to government expenditure exhibits a very low 
persistence: by the second quarter, the response drops significantly and by the forth quarter it 
is basically zero. The negative response of net taxes in the second quarter is counter-intuitive, 
as in the benchmark specification for a shock to purchases. 
Similarly to previous studies, direct expenditure has a positive impact on output. The 
response of private GDP after impact is relatively small and fades away quickly: private 
output increases on impact by about 0.2 percentage points, remains broadly stable in the 
following three quarters and then declines slowly; it becomes slightly negative starting in the 
8
th quarter. The response is estimated rather imprecisely: it is statistically significant only in 
the first two quarters. The responses of private consumption and investment are positive, but 
not significant. Overall, the results are in-between those of the shocks to purchases and wages 
in the benchmark model. Figure 15 shows the cumulative multiplier of a shock to total direct 
government expenditure. The value of the multiplier reaches a peak in the 6
th quarter, at 1.8, 
and gradually declines to just above unity in the fourth year. 
7.  Conclusions 
This paper has studied the effects of fiscal policy on private GDP, inflation and interest 
rates in Italy using a structural Vector Autoregression model and relying on a new database of 
quarterly cash data for fiscal variables. 
As in all comparable VAR studies, we examine the effects of a shock to total direct 
government spending using a 6-variable VAR, which includes private GDP, the private GDP   26
deflator, employment, the interest rate, direct expenditure and net revenue. We find, in line 
with previous studies, that direct expenditures have a positive effect on output. The effects of 
expenditure on itself, however, are far less persistent than those estimated for the U.S. 
economy, implying a response for output which is relatively small and fades away quickly. In 
terms of cumulative multiplier, an indicator which gauges the effects on economic activity per 
unit of expenditure, our results are on the high side of the evidence from comparable studies, 
being broadly similar to those reported, for the U.S., in Galí et al. (2006) and in Fatás and 
Mihov (2001) and, for France, in Biau and Girard (2005). 
In the benchmark 7-variable model we distinguish between wage expenditure and 
purchases of goods and services. We find that shocks to government purchases of goods and 
services have a relatively large effect on economic activity: an exogenous one per cent (in 
terms of private GDP) shock raises private real GDP by 0.6 per cent after 3 quarters. The 
response of private GDP goes to zero after two years, reflecting with a lag the relatively low 
persistence of the spending shock. The values of the cumulative multiplier (computed for 
overall GDP) at the 4
th, 8
th and 12
th quarters are 2.4, 2.4 and 1.7, respectively. These values 
would suggest that purchases have a larger impact on economic activity than that generally 
indicated by econometric models with “Keynesian” short-term features. The increase in 
economic activity is determined by the positive responses of both private consumption and 
investment. The effect on inflation is positive and short-lived. In contrast, public wages have 
no significant effect on output; a negative and significant effect on employment emerges after 
6 quarters. The reactions of inflation are negligible; those of interest rates are positive but not 
significant. Finally, shocks to net revenue have small and somewhat contradictory effects on 
all the macroeconomic variables. 
The results of our analysis are quite robust to the use of alternative models or different 
specifications of the benchmark model. We broadly confirm the results of other authors using 
comparable methods, but we are also able to distinguish between the two largest components 
of direct spending. Contrary to the results obtained by Fatás and Mihov (2001) using U.S. 
data, we find that purchases on goods and services have a greater impact on economic activity 
in Italy than spending on wages. 
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Appendix A – Construction of the data and comparison with national account data 
 
The sources of our general government data are the Italian Ministry of Treasury and the 
Bank of Italy. Since the early eighties, the Treasury publishes quarterly cash figures, covering 
actual payments and receipts of central and local governments, as well as those of health and 
social security institutions. Since 1994, the Treasury computes also the consolidated data for 
the general government sector. For the previous years (1982-1993) we sum the figures for 
each sub-sector, consolidating intergovernmental flows when possible. 
For the years for which information at both aggregate and sub-sector levels are available, 
the sum of state sector, local governments, health sector and social security institutions 
represents a rather constant percentage of total public sector figures (ranging on average 
between 94 and 100 per cent, depending on the budget item). We apply to each budget item, 
for the years before 1994, the corresponding scale factor. 
In our analysis we consider a 3-way disaggregation of the government budget. On the 
expenditure side we consider current spending on goods and services and public wages. All 
the remaining items, excluding interest payments, investment, debt settlements and 
privatization receipts, are included in net revenue. Net revenues are computed as a residual 
item starting from the Bank of Italy general government borrowing requirement. 
Statistics on the general government borrowing requirement (the deficit in cash terms) 
are published by the Bank of Italy on a monthly basis since the early eighties. The borrowing 
requirement is computed on the basis of changes in debt instruments, on which precise and 
almost complete information is available. 
The main reason why we exclude debt settlements and privatization receipts is that they 
are not considered in national accounts data. Moreover, outlays for debt settlements refer to 
expenditures undertaken in past periods, whereas privatization receipts cannot be thought of as 
resources compulsorily subtracted from the private sector. For these reasons, their impact on 
the economic activity should be negligible. We exclude interest payments because they are 
largely outside the scope of government control and investment because we are not confident   28
enough about the quality of the data (the ratio between cash and national account data on 
investment is very volatile over the sample period, ranging from about 80 per cent to almost 
100 per cent). 
Measuring net revenue as a residual from the cash deficit ensures a better coverage, 
because data on the individual revenue items are not statistically homogeneous over the 
sample period for a number of reasons, including the numerous tax reforms enacted during the 
sample. However, as a check, we also constructed net taxes from the sum of individual tax 
revenues, less transfers to households. The results do not qualitatively differ from those 
presented in this paper. 
Current spending on goods and services includes intermediate consumption and social 
transfers in kind (both included in government consumption). Raw data have been corrected to 
take into account that some of the expenditure included in this item refers to operations that 
are either not classifiable as government consumption or are not treated consistently over the 
sample period. In particular, we excluded compensations of banks for their revenue collection 
service, as this item is recorded, for accounting purposes and not on a regular basis, both on 
the expenditure and revenue side. Also, payments by the Municipality of Rome to local 
transport enterprises, which were recorded as transfers before 1998, have been subtracted from 
the series starting in that year. 
We also corrected the original series of public wages to increase homogeneity over the 
sample period. First, since contributions for retirement for its employees were not paid by the 
State to social security institutions until January 1996, we have subtracted from the original 
series these contributions for the following years (in national accounts this problem is treated 
by including, until 1996, an imputed value of notional contributions equal to State payments to 
retirees). Second, from 1994, salaries of University personnel were recorded as transfers to 
public entities rather than as public wages. Hence, we have added to the post-1994 figures an 
amount equal to the fraction of such payments in total wage expenditure observed in 1993. 
Before applying a statistical procedure to adjust for seasonality, we distributed evenly 
across quarters the corporate income taxes (IRPEG and ILOR) instalments, although this 
additional smoothing did not turn out to significantly affect our results. 
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A comparison of yearly national accounts data with our cash data, adjusted in the way 
described above, shows reasonably similar patterns (a detailed analysis and graphs are 
available from the authors upon request). National accounts series are generally smoother than 
cash series, mainly due to the accrual criterion adopted in the computation of the former. 
Until 1994, national accounts yearly data on current spending on goods and services are 
significantly higher than cash data, indicating that items recorded under these items in national 
accounts appear elsewhere in cash data; afterwards the difference shrinks, getting almost 
negligible in the last five years. Also for net revenue, national account data are higher than 
cash data; the difference remains more or less constant over the sample period. The series of 
public wages in cash and national account data almost coincide. 
As for quarterly data, we can only compare government consumption from the national 
accounts with the sum of current spending on goods and services and public wages in our cash 
data. While the raw data from the two sources are very similar, this is not true for the 
seasonally adjusted data, where the national account series is significantly smoother than our 
cash series. 
Finally, a comparison between cash and national account quarterly data for each of the 
three fiscal aggregates can be made for the period 1999-2004. For both spending items, the 
cash and national accounts series show very similar patterns. The series of net revenue in 
national accounts looks more volatile than our cash series, but this is due to the mechanical 
smoothing we performed on it. 
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Appendix B – Computation of the elasticities of fiscal variables 
 
In the approach used by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) to identify fiscal shocks it is 
necessary to employ estimates (obtained outside the VAR model) of the contemporaneous 
elasticities of the fiscal variables with respect to the macroeconomic variables. 
As for expenditure items, we assume that only purchases of goods and services are 
affected, and even then marginally, by changes in the price level in the same quarter. Our 
benchmark elasticity is 0.1, implying a –0.9 elasticity of the variable in real terms (we apply 
the private GDP deflator to all variables). Using lower or higher values (–1.0 and –0.5, as in 
Perotti, 2002) has almost no impact on the results. 
We assume that other influences of macro variables on direct expenditures are either 
extremely small or non-existent. The length of the procedures governing most payments 
simply exclude the possibility that a change in real GDP affects direct expenditure in the same 
quarter, either via automatic rules or via discretionary actions.
16 As for prices, a change in the 
GDP deflator does not influence wages in the same quarter as generalized pay increases are 
awarded only on the basis of contracts renewed every two years and there are lags between the 
signing of the contract and the actual payments.
17
We compute the elasticity of net revenue with respect to the macroeconomic variable j 
(εnr
varj) as the product of the elasticity of revenue to the macroeconomic variable j and the 




  *  r/nr 
As for the elasticity of revenue, we take into account that the bulk of the 
contemporaneous effects on revenue of private employment, GDP and GDP deflator comes 
                                                           
16  Real GDP may have indeed a limited contemporaneous influence on social transfers, but this budget items 
enters with a negative sign in our net revenue variable (see below). 
17  Over the sample period, only in the years 1982-1986 both private and public wages were indexed with a lag to 
prices.   31
from the withholding tax on employment income (IRPEF) and, in the case of the two latter 
variables, also from excises and VAT. 
Overall, we obtain elasticities of total real net revenue to employment, GDP, and GDP 
deflator of, respectively, 0.3, 0.3 and –0.4. Clearly, the elasticity with respect to GDP crucially 
depends on the inclusion in the VAR of the employment variable (or, in some alternative 
specifications, private wages). In the specifications without employment, the revenue elasticity 
with respect to GDP rises to 0.5. 
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Figure 1 
Seasonally-adjusted Government Expenditure Items 
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Effects of Government Purchases on GDP: Cumulative Multiplier 
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Figure 6 
Effects of Government Purchases on GDP: Benchmark Specification and BIQEM 
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Figure 7 
Effects of Government Purchases on GDP: 
Benchmark Specification and Alternative Models 


















Effects of Government Wages on GDP: 
Benchmark Specification and Alternative Models 
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Figure 9 
Effects of Government Consumption and Government Purchases+Wages 
on Themselves and on GDP: 5-Variable Model 
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Figure 11 
Effects of Governmentt Purchases on: GDP (Benchmark Specification), 
Private Consumption, Private Investment and Total Private Demand 
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Figure 12 
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Impulse Responses to a Positive Government Expenditure Shock: 6-Variable Model 
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Figure 14 
Impulse Responses to a Positive Government Net Revenue Shock: 6-Variable Model 
(1)
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Figure 15 
Effects of Government Expenditure on GDP: 
Cumulative Multiplier (6-Variable Model)
(1)
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